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ABSTRACT 
For approximately the past forty years, Republican Presidents have 
appointed younger Justices than have Democratic Presidents. Depending on 
how one does the accounting, the average age difference will vary, but will 
not go away. This Article posits that Republicans appointing younger 
justices than Democrats may have caused a rightward shift in the Supreme 
Court. We use computer simulations to show that if the trend continues the 
rightward shift will likely increase. We also produce some very rough 
estimates of the size of the ideological shift, contingent on the size of the 
age differential. In addition, we show that the Senate’s role in confirming 
nominated Justices has a significant moderating effect on the shift. Last, we 
consider the interaction between our results and the oft-proposed eighteen-
year staggered terms for Supreme Court Justices. We show that such an 
institutional change would almost completely wipe out the ideological 
effect of one Party appointing younger Justices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Presidents necessarily consider many criteria when choosing nominees 
for the Supreme Court. Such criteria include rewarding loyal political 
support and friendship by an individual, providing an important constituent 
group (women, racial minorities, southerners, ethnic minorities, etc.) a 
representative appointment, and putting an ideologically desirable thinker 
on the Court. Other criteria include educational credentials, professional 
reputation, intellectual and professional capability, confirmability, and age 
of the nominee. Many of these criteria interact with one another, 
complicating the selection decision by requiring trade-offs between them. 
One of the more important criteria is the age of the nominee. Age is very 
important because younger appointees can be expected to serve longer on 
the Court, influencing Court outcomes for a greater period of time. 
Republican Presidents regularly appoint younger Justices than do 
Democrats. Evidence demonstrates that Justices appointed by Republican 
Presidents average between 1.5 and 5 years younger than Justices appointed 
by Democratic Presidents, varying with, amongst other things, the historical 
period from which the data is taken. Using a computer simulation study, we 
demonstrate three propositions. First, and least surprising, if Republicans 
and Democrats behave in this fashion for an extended period of time, the 
Court will yield more conservative holdings, though the exact extent to 
which the Court’s positions will shift rightward in both the short- and long-
term depends on which of several models of Supreme Court decision-
making most accurately reflects how the Court’s opinions are actually 
decided. Second, and mildly surprising, the Senate confirmation process can 
greatly reduce the intensity of this rightward shift. Third, and most 
surprising (and completely unnoted before this article), the widely-touted 
proposal to limit Supreme Court Justices to a single eighteen-year term will 
almost completely eliminate the effect of the age differential, moving the 
Court back to the center of the ideological spectrum. The three propositions 
supported by our study have important implications for proposals to reform 
the nomination process and for possible strategic reactions by Democrats 
and Republicans. 
This article proceeds as follows. Section I will review the history of 
several nominations to the Supreme Court, discussing the factors that led, 
within the appointment process, to success or failure. Section II will provide 
a brief overview of the literature and review the various theories explaining 
precisely how the ideological leanings of particular Justices affects the 
Court’s ideology, and its extent, expressed in the Court’s holdings. Section 
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III will introduce a computer simulation of the nomination process. The 
simulation will model the interactions of the President, Senate, and Court in 
the appointment process over a period of 100 years. The model will 
simulate the elections of both Senators and Presidents and the departure of 
individual Justices, with the likelihood of a Justice’s departure depending 
partly on the age of the Justice. When a Justice leaves the Court, the 
President will nominate a replacement Justice, and the Senate will confirm. 
The appointed Justice will have an ideology dependent on the ideologies of 
the President and of either the median or the 60th (veto gate) Senator. If the 
President is Republican, the appointee will be fifty years of age. If the 
President is a Democrat, the new Justice will be 50+X years of age. X will 
be kept constant for each batch of runs of the model. The computerized 
game will run for 100 years, simulating the departures and appointments of 
Justices over this period, after which the Court median1 will be recorded. 
We will then rerun the model with the same X for another 100 years, and 
note the Court median. By running the model, with fixed X, several 
thousand times, we can get an empirical distribution of the Court median, 
contingent on that X. Then, by allowing X to be 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. years, we can 
map the long-run sensitivity of the location of the Court median to the 
difference in appointment strategies.  
Section III demonstrates three propositions. First, and least surprising, if 
Republicans and Democrats behave in this fashion for an extended period of 
time, the Court will become more conservative, though the extent of its 
rightward pull will vary in accordance with which theory examined in 
Section I is most accurate. Second, and mildly surprising, the Senate 
confirmation process can greatly reduce the intensity of this rightward shift. 
Third, and most surprising—and completely unnoted before this article—
the widely touted proposal to limit Supreme Court Justices to a single 
eighteen-year term will almost completely eliminate the effect of the 
differential in age, moving the Court back to the center of the ideological 
spectrum. This last insight is fully explored in Section IV. 
Section IV then proceeds to suggest hypotheses that might explain why 
the parties would choose such different strategies. The hypotheses will 
include different discount rates, different need to appoint representatives of 
constituencies, and different attitudes toward the politics of confirmation 
hearings. Section IV also explores the implications of this article on the age 
differential and also discusses means of altering the election and retirement 
                                                                                                                            
1. The Court median is the ideological location of the Justice in the middle. That is, there 
are four Justices to the right and four Justices to the left of the median. Lee Epstein & Tonja 
Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37, 37–99 (2008). 
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models used in the simulation found in Section III to glean additional 
insights. 
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL NOMINEES AND THE EFFECT OF AGE 
This section will provide a wide look at the history of recent judicial 
nominees to the Supreme Court, both successful and not. These 
appointments will be analyzed through the lens of a number of factors 
including conformability, educational credentials, ideological fitness and 
most importantly, age. This analysis will provide the groundwork for our 
assertion that the practice of one party nominating consistently younger 
Justices is likely to have to a quantifiable and substantial impact on the 
political locus of the Court. 
A. Examples of Trade-offs 
Presidents often desire to reward a loyal political friendship, and though 
one means of doing so is through the judicial nomination process, satisfying 
this criterion at the Supreme Court level proves to be one of the hardest 
feats to accomplish. George W. Bush’s nomination of Harriet Miers 
provides a recent, vivid example. There is no doubt that Harriet Miers was a 
long-term, loyal, active supporter of the President. She served as counsel to 
George W. Bush’s gubernatorial campaign in Texas2 and White House 
counsel to Bush when he was President.3 Nominating Miers clearly satisfied 
his desire to reward a loyal political supporter. In addition, because Miers 
would be replacing Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the only Republican 
woman on the Court,4 it was expected that Republican women would 
support another of “their own” as an ideal replacement on the Court. 
However, other selection criteria weighed against the Miers nomination, 
namely educational credentials, intellectual and professional capability, and 
ideology. Most Supreme Court Justices attend elite, highly-ranked law 
schools such as Yale, Harvard, and Stanford.5 In contrast, Harriet Miers 
                                                                                                                            
2. Michael A. Fletcher, White House Counsel Miers Chosen for Court, WASH. POST (Oct. 
4, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/03/AR2005100300252.html. 
3. Timothy Williams, Bush Names Counsel as Choice for Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 3, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/03/politics/politicsspecial1/03cnd-
scotus.html?pagewanted =1&_r=0&adxnnlx=1128359309-bSDq8w/TsOCk88gkjBwe8w. 
4. Id. 
5. Of the sitting Justices at that time, Justice Stevens arguably graduated from the least 
prestigious law school—Northwestern—which was ranked tenth (tied with Duke) in 1995. Dan 
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graduated from Southern Methodist Univeristy Law School,6 ranked forty-
seventh in the nation in 2005 by U.S. News and World Report.7 By means 
of comparison, Justice O’Connor, whom Miers would replace, graduated 
from Stanford Law School, which ranked third in the nation.8 In addition, to 
some, Harriet Miers lacked intellectual and professional capability because 
she seemed to have little knowledge of Constitutional Law.9 To be fair to 
Ms. Miers, her academic and professional experiences demonstrated that 
she was likely extremely smart and able. Her undergraduate degree was in 
mathematics, she became the first female President of the Texas State Bar,10 
and she was the managing partner of Locke, Liddell & Sapp, a large Dallas 
law firm.11 However, nothing in her background suggested a depth of 
knowledge about Constitutional Law. The Senate Judiciary Committee 
asked Miers to redo the answers she had submitted to questions she had 
been asked because the answers were “inadequate,”12 which was further 
suggestive of issues with competency. There were also questions about her 
ideology; conservatives suspected that she was too moderate,13 and she 
lacked a paper trail that would permit vetting of her views.14 And, because 
                                                                                                                            
Filler, US News Law School Rankings: A Comparison With 1998 and 1995, CONCURRING 
OPINIONS (Apr. 3, 2006, 1:00 AM), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/04/us_news_law_sch.html. Justice Stevens 
not only finished first in his class, but also earned the highest GPA in the history of 
Northwestern Law. Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, Justice John Paul Stevens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
23, 2007, at 650, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-
t.html?pagewanted=all. 
6. Michael A. Fletcher, Quiet but Ambitious White House Counsel Makes Life of Law, 
WASH. POST, June 21, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/20/AR2005062001161.html. 
7. See U.S. News Rankings of Law Schools for 2005, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 
http://www.lawschool.com/usn2005.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
8. See id. 
9. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBERG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 279 (2007); Mike Madden, 
Why Elena Kagan Won’t Be the Next Harriet Miers, SALON (May 10, 2010, 5:22 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2010/05/10/elena_kagan_is_not_harriet_miers. 
10. Williams, supra note 3, at 1. 
11. Fletcher, supra note 2, at 1. 
12. MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT 
CONFIRMATIONS 214–15 (2d ed. 2007). 
13. Elisabeth Bumiller & Carl Hulse, Bush’s Court Choice Ends Bid; Conservatives 
Attacked Miers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/28/politics/politicsspecial1/28confirm.html?pagewanted=all. 
14. Terry Eastland, The Lessons of Alito, WEEKLY STANDARD (Feb. 6, 2006), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/648jhqpm.asp. 
  
 
 
 
46 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
she was sixty years old in 2005,15 she promised to be on the Court for a very 
long time. 
In the end, the opposition from the right wing of the Republican Party, 
and from Democrats,16 proved too substantial. Harriet Miers withdrew her 
name from consideration.17  
The nomination of John Paul Stevens illuminates the interaction of two 
criteria, confirmability and ideology, only without the public fight that 
Harriet Miers’s nomination produced. President Gerald Ford, a Republican 
conservative (by the standards of the day), was regarded as weak,18 never 
having been elected to national office.19 Ford was appointed Vice President 
when Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned,20 and ascended to the 
Presidency only upon the resignation of President Nixon, rather than by 
election.21 Thus, President Ford had no national base of voters.22 When 
William O. Douglas left the Court in 1975,23 Robert Bork was the 
overwhelming preference of conservative Republicans to take Douglas’s 
seat on the Court.24 However, as liberal Democrats firmly controlled the 
Senate,25 President Ford likely anticipated that he could not get Bork’s 
nomination through the Senate, and was unlikely to be able to drum up 
                                                                                                                            
15. Williams, supra note 3, at 1. 
16. In hindsight, the Democrats might have been better served with Miers on the Court 
than Alito, who was confirmed in her place. See Mark Sherman, Samuel Alito, Supreme Court 
Justice, Takes on Citizens United Critics, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2012, 11:35 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/17/samuel-alito-supreme-cour_n_2150018.html 
(showing, in part, Alito’s distaste for Democratic principles, such as a strong federal 
government). 
17. Bumiller & Hulse, supra note 13. 
18. IVAN ELAND, RECARVING RUSHMORE: RANKING THE PRESIDENTS ON PEACE, 
PROSPERITY, AND LIBERTY 335 (2009). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. JOHN B. ROBERTS, II, RATING THE FIRST LADIES: THE WOMEN WHO INFLUENCED THE 
PRESIDENCY 302 (updated ed. 2004). In fact, Gerald Ford was a member of the House of 
Representatives (R-Mich.) when he was appointed Vice President, and did not even have a 
statewide voting constituency. See DONALD A. RITCHIE, THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: 
A STUDENT COMPANION 95 (2006). 
23. James E. DiTullio & John B. Schochet, Saving This Honorable Court: A Proposal to 
Replace Life Tenure with Staggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen-year Terms, 90 VA. L. REV. 1093, 
1094 (2004). 
24. ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK 
AMERICA 16–17 (2007). 
25. GERALD R. FORD, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: GERALD 
FORD: CONTAINING THE PUBLIC MESSAGES, SPEECHES, AND STATEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT 
1976–77: BOOK III–JULY 10, 1976 TO JANUARY 20, 1977, at 2642 (1979). 
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national support for Bork. So, instead of nominating the very conservative 
Bork, ideologically ideal but difficult to confirm, Ford nominated a much 
more liberal Republican, John Paul Stevens.26 The Democratic Senate 
responded by confirming Stevens quickly. Stevens, who was fifty-five at 
the time of his nomination and confirmation,27 went on to serve thirty-four 
years on the Court,28 the third-longest period in history.29 
Finally, the failed nominations of Clement Haynsworth and Harrold 
Carswell illustrate the difficulty of providing a political constituency (in 
these two cases, southerners) a representative appointment while also 
satisfying the criteria of ideology, educational credentials, professional 
reputation, and confirmability. When the liberal Abe Fortas left the Court, 
President Nixon decided to appoint a southerner who believed in a 
conservative “strict constructionist” interpretation of the Constitution.30 
Nixon’s first attempt was Clement Haynsworth, a Harvard graduate who 
was then sitting on the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.31 
Haynsworth, who was fifty-six at the time he was nominated,32 was attacked 
by Senators as being too conservative and of sitting on cases where he had a 
financial interest.33 The barrage of criticism was too much; he was rejected 
by the Senate.34 President Nixon then nominated George Harrold Carswell, 
a fifty-year-old judge of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.35 
Carswell’s nomination ran into serious trouble when a film surfaced of him 
                                                                                                                            
26. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Exclusive: Supreme Court Justice Stevens Remembers 
President Ford, ABC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=2765753. 
27. J. SCOTT HARR & KÄREN M. HESS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 70 (4th ed. 2007). 
28. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Stevens’s Retirement is Political Test for 
Obama, N.Y. TIMES, April 9 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/us/politics/10stevens.html. 
29. Tony Mauro, Courtside: Stevens May Be the Second-Longest Serving Justice After All, 
NAT’L L. J. (July 7, 2010), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202463293924?slreturn=20140024155916. 
30. JOHN P. AVLON, INDEPENDENT NATION: HOW THE VITAL CENTER IS CHANGING THE 
FACE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 271 (2004). 
31. Joseph Calluori, The Supreme Court Under Siege: The Battle Over Nixon’s Nominees, 
in RICHARD M. NIXON: POLITICIAN, PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATOR 361, 362 (L. Friedman & W.F. 
Levantrosser eds., 1991). 
32. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Clement Furman Haynsworth, Jr., 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1008 (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
33. Calluori, supra note 31, at 363. 
34. Id. 
35. See id.; Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: George Harrold Carswell, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=387&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
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publicly embracing racial segregation in 1948.36 And Carswell, a graduate 
of Mercer University School of Law,37 lacked satisfactory educational 
credentials, as demonstrated by the fact that currently Mercer is not ranked 
in the top 100 of the U.S. News Rankings for law schools,38 listed instead as 
a “tier 3” school.39 Independent of his schooling, Carswell was regarded by 
many as a “low quality” appellate judge.40 The debate was sufficiently 
intense to prompt Senator Roman Hruska to issue his now-famous defense 
of mediocrity (and, perhaps, a veiled bit of anti-Semitism) as an interest-
group issue.41 Carswell also went down in defeat.42 
President Nixon then threw in the towel and nominated a middle-of-the-
road Minnesotan and Harvard Law graduate, Harry Blackmun.43 The Senate 
swiftly confirmed the sixty-one-year-old Blackmun with little fuss.44 
Blackmun served on the Court for twenty-four years.45 
B. Looking at Age 
These examples show that “age happens.” The interaction between the 
President’s nomination criteria can be complex, and greatly limits his 
choices. A President may desire a younger Justice who will influence the 
Court’s ideological direction for a greater span of time, but since the age of 
the nominees is just one criterion influencing the decision, the trade-off 
                                                                                                                            
36. Calluori, supra note 31, at 364. 
37. John Schwartz, An Ivy-Covered Path to the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2009, 
at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/us/politics/09ivy.html. 
38. The U.S. News Rankings did not exist at the time of Carswell’s nomination, so we 
base our assessment of Mercer Law School’s reputation on current rankings. See Best Law 
Schools: Ranked in 2013, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-
rankings/page+5 (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). We strongly suspect that Mercer has never been 
regarded as a top law school; there is very little change in U.S. News’ rankings of the top 
twenty-five law schools from year to year. 
39. Id.  
40. See, e.g., Calluori, supra note 31, at 364; ROBERT LANGRAN, THE SUPREME COURT: A 
CONCISE HISTORY 4–5 (2004).  
41. William H. Honan, Roman L. Hruska Dies at 94; Leading Senate Conservative, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 27, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/27/us/roman-l-hruska-dies-at-94-
leading-senate-conservative.html (“Even if he were mediocre . . . there are a lot of mediocre 
judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren’t they, and a 
little chance? We can’t have all Brandeises, Frankfurters and Cardozos.”). 
42. Calluori, supra note 31, at 364. 
43. Id. at 365. 
44. Id. at 365; Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Harry Andrew Blackmun, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=187 (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
45. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Harry Andrew Blackmun, supra note 44. 
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with other criteria may require the nomination of an older Justice. Thus, the 
overall trade-offs determine the age of the appointees. 
Rather than merely accept that age is a significant selection criterion, 
shrug, and walk away from the issue, we suggest taking a closer look at 
age’s effects on the long-term ideological direction of the Court and, in 
particular, the magnitude of its effects. These effects may be considerable 
because Supreme Court Justices are appointed for life,46 and tend to stay in 
the job for many years longer than a typical professional in any other job. 
With this observation in mind, we suggest asking what would happen if one 
party were routinely to appoint Justices who were older than appointees of 
the other party. How much difference, we ask, would this make to the 
political and ideological make-up of the Court in the long run? 
Why would we ask this question? Because there is some evidence that 
one party is routinely appointing older nominees. An examination of recent 
appointments has revealed that Democrats appoint older Justices than 
Republicans. The magnitude of the difference in age varies, depending on 
which nominees are counted.47 Since the appointment of William H. 
Rehnquist to the Supreme Court in 1971, Republican appointees to the 
Court have averaged 50.75 years of age, while Democratic appointees have 
averaged 55.25 years of age, for a difference of 4.50 years.48 
Alternative measures also show that Republicans appoint younger 
members of the Court, but these measures vary in the magnitude of the 
difference. Thus, for example, if we were to include the failed nominees 
                                                                                                                            
46. How the Federal Courts are Organized: Federal Judges and How They Get 
Appointed, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/page/A783011AF949B6BF85256B35004AD214 (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
47. We are indebted to Tom Miles for a very well organized parsing of this question.  
48. In this section, we will designate an appointee by the party of the appointing President, 
regardless of the actual ideology or party affiliation of the appointee; a Republican appointee is 
one appointed by a Republican President, and a Democratic appointee is one appointed by a 
Democratic President. However, parts II (A) and II (B) of this article will feature a more 
nuanced treatment of the party affiliation of the appointee. The Republican appointees, with 
their ages at time of nomination, are John Paul Stevens (fifty-five years old), Sandra Day 
O’Connor (fifty-one years old), Antonin Scalia (fifty years old), Anthony Kennedy (fifty-one 
years old), David Souter (fifty-one years old), Clarence Thomas (forty-three years old), John 
Roberts (fifty years old), and Samuel Alito (fifty-five years old). The Democratic appointees are 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg (sixty years old), Stephen Breyer (fifty-six years old), Sonia Sotomayor 
(fifty-five years old), and Elena Kagan (fifty years old). See generally Biographical Directory of 
Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
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Robert Bork (sixty years old),49 Douglas Ginsburg (fifty-one years old),50 
and Harriet Miers (sixty years old),51 the average difference diminishes to 
2.8 years,52 and if we include Lewis Powell (sixty-four years old,53 and 
confirmed just before Rehnquist)54 and Harry Blackmun (sixty-one years 
old,55 and confirmed just prior to Powell),56 the difference in average ages 
diminishes to 1.25 years.57 On the other hand, if we exclude President 
Obama’s appointments and the failed Republican nominees, and start with 
Rehnquist, the average difference in appointees’ ages balloons to almost 
eight years.58 If we include only “first choice” nominees,59 and measure 
                                                                                                                            
49. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Robert Heron Bork, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=216 (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
50. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Douglas Howard Ginsburg, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=864 (last visited Jan. 29, 2014); Steven 
V. Roberts, Ginsburg Withdraws Name As Supreme Court Nominee, Citing Marijuana 
‘Clamor’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/08/us/ginsburg-
withdraws-name-as-supreme-court-nominee-citing-marijuana-
clamor.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
51. Williams, supra note 3. 
52. Inclusion of these nominees raises the average age of Republican nominees to 52.45 
years old. 
53. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Lewis Franklin Powell Jr., FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1927 (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
54. Supreme Court Nominations, present–1789, U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 
2014). 
55. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Harry Andrew Blackmun, FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=187 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
56. Supreme Court Nominations, present–1789, supra note 54. 
57. Inclusion of these nominees raises the average age of Republican nominees to 54.00 
years old. 
58. Inclusion of Rehnquist and exclusion of the failed nominees yields an average age of 
50.25 for Republican Justices. Exclusion of President Obama’s appointees yields an average age 
of 58.00 for Democratic Justices. 
59. Those who were the first nominated for an open seat, whether or not ultimately 
confirmed, are “first choice” nominees. For example, Harriett Miers was a first choice nominee. 
Calculating average age for “first choice” nominees requires the substitution of Robert Bork’s 
age for that of Anthony Kennedy, since Bork was the “first choice” nominee for Justice 
Powell’s seat, and the substitution of Harriet Miers’s age for Samuel Alito, since Miers was the 
“first choice” nominee for Justice O’Connor’s seat. Supreme Court Nominations present–1789, 
supra note 54. Although John Roberts was technically the “first choice” nominee for Justice 
O’Connor’s seat, since his nomination was withdrawn solely so he could instead be nominated 
to take Chief Justice Rehnquist’s seat, we have elected to consider Miers as the “first choice” 
nominee for Justice O’Connor’s seat. See Richard S. Beth & Betsy Palmer, Supreme Court 
Nominations: Senate Floor Procedure and Practice, 1789–2006, in SENATE OF THE UNITED 
STATES: COMMITTEES, RULES AND PROCEDURES 349, 362 (Jason B. Cattler & Charles M. Rice 
eds., 2008). 
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since Rehnquist, the difference shrinks to 2.75 years.60 However, no 
reasonable manipulation of the data will completely eliminate or reverse the 
difference.61 
“So what?” a skeptical reader might ask, bristling a bit at the hints of 
ageism implicit in this finding. After all, as we just explained above, when a 
President chooses a nominee for a vacancy on the Supreme Court, he must 
balance several often-competing criteria: confirmability, educational 
credentials, professional reputation, intellectual and professional 
capability,62 experience, ideological similarity to the President, providing 
constituents a representative appointment, paying off political favors, and 
age. Hence, age emerges from a complex, multifactor balancing process 
involving numerous trade-offs. In addition, Democratic Presidents have had 
only four appointments (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) during 
this period.63 Why should we worry about age, as opposed to other criteria? 
This article produces a tentative answer to the “so what” question by 
focusing on the interaction between two of the many criteria that a President 
must consider, age and ideology. The basic, intuitive theory runs as follows: 
the age of an appointee is particularly important because an appointment to 
the Supreme Court is for life.64 A Justice may stay for as long as he or she 
wishes, and cannot be forced to retire.65 As a matter of common sense, one 
would expect  younger appointees to live longer, and thus have longer 
                                                                                                                            
60. Considering only “first choice” nominees would result in the raising of the average age 
of Republican nominees to 52.50 years old. 
61. There is strong evidence that President Obama is nominating older people to the lower 
federal courts than did recent Republican Presidents. See generally David Fontana & Micah 
Schwartzman, Old World, NEW REPUBLIC (July 17, 2009), 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/old-world. Thus, the average age of appointees to the lower 
federal courts was fifty under President Reagan, forty-nine under President George H.W. Bush 
and fifty under President George W. Bush, while the average age of appointees to the lower 
federal courts for President Obama is currently fifty-five. Id. Our thanks to Micah Schwartzman 
for allowing us to use his data. 
62. See generally Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1383 (2009) (discussing the difficulties in measuring judicial quality). 
63. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Robert Heron Bork, supra note 49. 
64. How the Federal Courts are Organized: Federal Judges and How They Get 
Appointed, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/page/A783011AF949B6BF85256B35004AD214 (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2014). 
65. A Justice of the Supreme Court can be removed through the impeachment and 
conviction process provided in the Constitution, but that is a cumbersome process that has not 
been invoked for a member of the Supreme Court for approximately 200 years. SANDRA DAY 
O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 80 (2003).  
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tenures on the Court.66 If one allows age to interact with ideology, 
appointments can have a long-term effect on the ideology of each of the 
sitting Justices. A younger conservative appointee should be a conservative 
Justice for longer than an older conservative appointee would be. Similarly, 
a younger liberal appointee should be a liberal Justice for longer than an 
older liberal appointee would be. More importantly, with Republican 
appointees being younger than Democratic ones, a younger conservative 
Republican appointee should be a conservative Justice for longer than an 
older liberal Democrat appointee will be a liberal Justice. Thus, the relative 
youth of Republican appointees should, in the long run, pull the law 
“rightward”—that is, result in more qualitatively conservative holdings by 
the Court.67 
Closely related is the issue of whether Supreme Court Justices should be 
limited to a single eighteen-year term in office. Many articles, found 
primarily in law reviews, have been published on the topic, and recently 
thirty-three leading law professors wrote an open letter to Vice President 
Joseph Biden, Attorney General Eric Holder, and other public officials 
urging the imposition of this limitation on Supreme Court Justices.68 Some 
of the articles note a connection between unlimited terms of office and 
pressure to appoint young Justices.69 Several pieces in the popular press 
have noted the suggestion for limited terms.70 
                                                                                                                            
66. Although a Justice’s ideology may drift over time, on average appointing a liberal or a 
conservative who will sit for many years will tend to pull the court in that direction. See 
generally Lee Epstein et al., Do Political Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 801 (1998). To simplify the modeling, this article will ignore 
this ideological drift. 
67.  As we show in section II (A & B) below, the law should follow the ideological 
preferences of Justices under all of the theories of judicial behavior extant in political science, 
with the possible exception of a naïve claim that all judges find “the law” in the same way, 
regardless of ideology. 
68. See Paul DeWitt Carrington, Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act (Feb. 9, 2009), 
http://paulcarrington.com/Four%20Proposals%20for%20a%20Judiciary%20Act.htm. 
69. See generally REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 
(Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006); see also Steven G. Calabresi & James 
Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 770, 774 (2006). 
70. Robert Barnes, Legal Experts Propose Limiting Justices’ Powers, Terms, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/22/AR2009022201863.html; Jonathan Bernstein, Term Limits for 
Supreme Court Justices? Living Under the Dead Hand of the People Who Voted in Decades-
Ago Elections, SALON (May 11, 2010, 8:03 AM) 
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/feature/2010/05/11/term_limits_justices_open2010; John 
A. Farrell, No Supreme Court Term Limits—Even With Partisan Justices Like Scalia and 
Thomas, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 23, 2009), 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY 
Our belief that, as a general matter, retirements and appointments can 
change the Court’s politics is hardly new. Both political scientists71 and 
lawyers72 agree with this proposition. Based on this belief, Senators tend to 
vote on confirmations based largely on party and ideology.73 
Farnsworth provides the most complete current discussion of age of 
appointees and ideology in the legal literature.74 He argues that most judges 
retire at about eighty, and that if a President appoints an aged Justice to the 
Court, the President gives up the possible influence that that Justice might 
have years from now. To illustrate this proposition, Farnsworth offers an 
extremely simple statistical model in which one party always offers 
nominees whose expected years of service on the Court is exactly twice the 
years of expected service of nominees of the other party, and each party has 
exactly a 50% chance of making each appointment. This approach is a good 
                                                                                                                            
http://politics.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/john-farrell/2009/02/23/no-supreme-court-term-limits-
-even-with-partisan-justices-like-scalia-and-thomas; Ruth Marcus, Term Limits for Supreme 
Court Justices, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2010, 2:59 PM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2010/04/term_limits_for_supreme_court.html. 
71. See generally DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 
AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999); LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, 
ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (2007). 
72. See generally Scott A. Moss, The Courts Under President Obama, 86 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 727 (2009). 
73. MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT 
CONFIRMATIONS 71 (2d ed. 2007). 
74. We have found two articles that examine the age of Justices. See, e.g., Ward 
Farnsworth, The Regulation of Turnover on the Supreme Court, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 407 
(2005); Kevin T. McGuire, Are the Justices Serving Too Long? An Assessment of Tenure on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 89 JUDICATURE 8 (2005). McGuire does not, however, investigate party or 
ideology as it interacts with age. Id. Farnsworth, on the other hand, discusses age and its 
interaction with ideology at length. Farnsworth, supra, at 424–30. Farnsworth describes the 
pressure on Presidents to choose young nominees:  
Presidents from different parties take turns making appointments, creating a 
natural prisoner’s dilemma: if I appoint older Justices while presidents from 
the other party appoint younger ones, I enlarge the influence of those other 
presidents at my expense; indeed, no matter what the next president of the 
other party does, I am better off appointing younger Justices—though we 
both would be better off appointing older, better ones if we could bind 
ourselves through limits on their terms. 
Id. at 428. Powe provides an excellent comparison of the ages of Justices with the ages of other 
political leaders and finds that Justices are much older. L.A. Powe, Jr., Marble Palace, We’ve 
Got a Problem—With You, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES, supra note 69, at 104–07. 
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first step. Our article is designed to produce a more sophisticated model of 
these processes and generate more illuminating results.  
Our review of the law and political science literature is shaped by a step-
by-step examination of the sequential appointment game that eventually, 
through the votes of appointed Justices, produces legal outcomes on the 
court (the “Judicial Policy Sequential Game”). In particular, the game has 
four steps. 
 
Judicial Appointment and Judicial 
Policy Sequential Game
Court 
chooses 
legal 
outcome 
and 
opinion
New 
Justice is 
confirmed 
and added 
to Court
President 
nominates 
new 
Justice for 
Senate to 
confirm or 
reject
Justice 
leaves 
Court 
through 
death or 
retirement 
or 
choosing 
senior 
status
 
Figure 1 
 
In this paper, as in much of the legal and political science literature, we 
presume that the strategies chosen by political actors are shaped by their 
assessment of the outcomes of subsequent stages in the game. For example, 
in this game, a President would look ahead to Stages 3 and 4 to figure out 
which person to nominate to the Court, attempting to predict, of those 
possible candidates who would be confirmed, who will best shape Court 
outcomes and opinions in a way that will appeal to the President. Likewise, 
in Stage 3, the Senate will attempt to predict whether the nominee will 
affect Court outcomes and opinions in a way that will satisfy the Senate. 
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Thus, to understand the Judicial Policy Sequential Game, we will start 
with Stage 4, and survey current theories in political science75 and law that 
connect the ideology of specific Justices to the Court’s outcomes and 
opinions. With the theories in hand, we can understand what effect, if any, a 
change in one Justice might produce. 
A. Theories Focusing on the Median Justice 
1. Median Justice (“MJ”) 
Most of the literature presumes that outcomes and opinions follow the 
preferences of the Court’s median Justice.76 Such a model usually assumes 
that Justices’ preferences (amongst the doctrines possibly controlling the 
case) can be arrayed on a single dimension (usually liberal to conservative) 
and that Justices have single-peaked preferences over doctrinal outcomes. 
The further an outcome is from a Justice’s ideal location, the less the Justice 
likes it. Under these circumstances, the Justice who has exactly four Justices 
to her right and four Justices to her left is the median Justice, and she should 
be able to get exactly what she wants out of the court. Since the court is 
assumed to operate under rules that are quite “open”—any Justice can offer 
an alternative opinion to the one that is circulating prior to a vote—the 
median Justice should be able to whipsaw those on her left against those on 
her right. At the end of the day the median Justice should get exactly what 
she wants.  
                                                                                                                            
75. All of these theories are “political” within Frank Cross’s typology of judicial decision 
making. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1457, 1471 (2003). 
76. “[C]onsider surely the most prominent theory of Supreme Court decision making, the 
Median Voter (MV) approach.” Charles Cameron et al., Shaping Supreme Court Policy 
Through Appointments: The Impact of a New Justice, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1820, 1827 (2009). 
There are several other prominent examples. See, e.g., THOMAS HAMMOND ET AL., STRATEGIC 
BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2005); Lynn A. Baker, 
Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The Case for Common Sense in the Search for the Swing 
Justice, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 187 (1996); Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous 
Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 63 (1996); Epstein & 
Jacobi, supra note 1; Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory 
of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003). 
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Median Justice Theory
Median 
Justice
Four Justices to 
left of Median 
Justice
Four Justices to 
right of Median 
Justice
1   2        3                 4                   5         6          7                8       9
Justices 1 through 4 offer 
something to the left of 
Median Justice’s ideal 
outcome.
Median Justice counters by offering 
something closer to her ideal on right, 
garnering votes of 6 through 9, forcing 1 
through 4 to respond with a second 
alternative, even closer to MJ’s ideal.  The 
whipsawing continues until the outcome = 
MJ.
 
Figure 2 
 
The Median Justice Theory predicts this outcome regardless of who 
writes the opinion. As long as the ideal policies and outcomes of the median 
Justice do not change, Court outcomes should be unchanged. 
Although the Median Justice Theory is a bit heavy-handed, it does 
accord with received wisdom that the Justice in the middle gets her way, 
reflected in casual empiricism and serious scholarship about the Court. 
Newspapers and magazine articles commonly refer to the “swing” Justice.77  
Estrich and  Sullivan’s article Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of 
One was targeted at Justice O’Connor, widely assumed to be the median 
Justice.78 Epstein and Jacobi’s “Super Medians” gains its intellectual heft 
                                                                                                                            
77. E.g., John M. Broder, Armageddon! Measuring the Power of a New Justice, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/06/weekinreview/06broder.html; 
Dahlia Lithwick, Obama Shouldn’t Try to Pick a Persuasive Justice, NEWSWEEK (May 6, 2010), 
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/07/the-limits-of-influence.html. 
78. Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience 
of One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 122 (1989); see also Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Restrictions at 
the Margins of Heller and the Abortion Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons, and 
the Attitudinalist Critique, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1312 (2009). 
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from the Median Justice Theory, and a substantial literature focuses on 
techniques for finding empirically the median Justice.79 
This paper does not assume that the Median Justice Theory is correct. 
Rather, the paper introduces the Median Justice Theory because of its place 
in the academic literature and in popular accounts of the Court, and, of 
course, because it might be correct. The simulation will be interpreted in 
accordance with the Median Justice Theory only because it affords an 
opportunity to quickly show the importance of our computer simulations. 
However, our work is important even if one of the other theories, detailed 
below, more accurately predicts how the ideology of an individual Justice 
affects the holdings by the Court, as even under these other theories, a 
difference in the age of Democratic and Republican nominees to the Court 
will change Court outcomes.  
2. Majority Median Justice (“MMJ”) 
The Majority Median Justice Theory significantly extends the Median 
Justice Theory.80 The MJ theory assumed that Justices care about exactly 
one thing—the doctrine (or rule) chosen by the Court. In contrast, MMJ 
theory is premised on a more complex assumption.81 Each case is comprised 
of a set of facts, which is identically and clearly perceived by each of the 
Justices.82 A legal doctrine is conceptualized as a mapping of all possible 
sets of facts into outcomes (plaintiff wins or defendant wins). To make the 
model solvable, MMJ assumes that facts can be uniquely arrayed on a one-
dimensional continuum, and that this is the same dimension that we use for 
ordering Justice’s preferences over legal rules. A rule, in this one 
                                                                                                                            
79. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill, Identifying the Median Justice on the 
Supreme Court Through Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis of “Natural Courts” 1953–1991, 
112 PUB. CHOICE 55 (2002); Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States 
Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005). 
80. See Cliff Carrubba et al., Does the Median Justice Control the Content of Supreme 
Court Opinions? 33 (Dec. 23, 2008) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/wp/wp-
content/uploads/centers/clbe/vanberg_does_the_median_justice.pdf. 
81. In an important paper, Edward Schwartz provides the first formal model (of which we 
are aware) of how Justices’ consideration of multiple facts rather than the propriety of a single 
rule can produce an opinion deviating from the MJ prediction. Edward P. Schwartz, Policy, 
Precedent, and Power: A Positive Theory of Supreme Court Decision-Making, 8 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 219, 220 (1992). 
82. This is implicit in the structure of the model set out in Carrubba et al.’s article, but not 
emphasized in its exposition. Carrubba et al., supra note 80, at 8. 
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dimensional setting, is just a scalar.83 Any case with facts less than the 
number incorporated in the rule is decided for one of the parties, while a 
case with facts above the number is decided for the other party. 
In real cases the MMJ theory must be applicable to the formulation and 
application of rules influenced by multiple facts. For example, if the issue is 
whether probable cause exists for a search warrant, resolving the issue 
requires examining facts such as the defendant’s criminal history, 
credibility of informants, characteristics of the location searched, etc. A 
more conservative Justice may more readily find probable cause on a lesser 
showing of these various facts than would a more liberal Justice. 
A clearer demonstration of how this theory functions may be found in 
the following example, which, for the purpose of illustration, is simplified 
to involve a rule with a numerical value: the Court is considering a 
constitutional challenge to a statute penalizing a defendant’s “willful 
failure” to pay parking tickets that are seventy days overdue with a sentence 
of up to one year in jail. The issue is whether the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment puts a lower bound on the number of days overdue 
a parking ticket must be before the state can attach criminal penalties for 
failure to pay. In this example, one conservative Justice thinks that a ticket 
even seven days overdue permits the state to attach criminal penalties in 
compliance with the Due Process Clause. One liberal Justice believes that 
the Due Process Clause prohibits attachment of criminal penalties until the 
parking ticket is at least 180 days overdue. Other Justices will have 
intermediate views of what the Due Process Clause requires. These views 
provide the array of ideal doctrinal rules that we see in Figure 3, below. 
Each case comes with its own set of legally-relevant facts. In our 
example, these facts would be the number of days the defendant’s parking 
ticket was overdue. These facts determine, for each Justice, whether the 
defendant should win his case against the government or go to jail. 
                                                                                                                            
83. This framework is due to Kornhauser. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial 
Courts. II. Legal Doctrine, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441, 446–51 (1992). 
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Median Justice Theory With Intense Preferences 
For Individual Case Outcomes
1   2        3                 4                   5         6          7                8       9
This case involves parking ticket only 70 
days overdue.  Justices 6 through 9 think 
government should win, but 1 through 5 
think defendant should win.
180  170    150            110               80        60       40              15      7
Minimum # of days overdue before 
parking ticket can garner criminal 
penalties
If the Justices care so deeply 
about whether or not 
defendant wins that they 
cannot switch sides for a 
“better” rule, bargaining is 
only between Justices 1 
through 5.
 
Figure 3 
 
Typically, under the Median Justice Theory, the median Justice 
determines the holding because that Justice can play off the Justices to the 
right against the Justices to the left. However, this may not occur when the 
Justices have such an interest in which party wins that they cannot “switch 
sides.”84 The following example, built on the earlier parking ticket 
hypothetical, and illustrated in Figure 3, demonstrates this point. Assume 
that in the hypo, the defendant’s parking ticket is seventy days overdue. 
Justice 5, the median Justice, wants the defendant to win. Justices 6 through 
9, more conservative than (to the right of) Justice 5, want the government to 
win. Justices 1 through 5, more liberal than (to the left of) Justice 5, want 
the defendant to win. 
Justice 4 proposes a rule requiring at least 110 days. Justice 5 could 
propose, say, a rule requiring eighty days. Justice 5 would prefer a rule of 
eighty days to a rule of 110 days. Justices 1 through 4 would prefer a rule of 
110 days to one of eighty days. Justices 6 through 9 prefer a rule of eighty 
days to 110 days, but because a rule of eighty days would result in the 
                                                                                                                            
84. Cliff Carrubba et al., Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions?, 56 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 400, 401–02 (2012); see also Cameron et al., supra note 76, at 1844. 
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defendant winning, which is an undesirable outcome, they would not 
embrace an eighty-day rule. Justice 5 could woo Justices 6 through 9 by 
offering, say, a rule of only sixty-five days. Because here, the defendant’s 
parking ticket was seventy days overdue, the government would win and 
thus Justices 6 through 9 would vote for such a rule, it being preferable to a 
rule of 110 days. But Justice 5, herself, cannot endorse her own proposed 
rule, as it would require her to switch sides and vote for the government to 
win, which she would not do. 
Thus, under these circumstances, only the views of Justices 1 through 5 
will be relevant in determining the final rule, since the normal bargaining 
between Justice 5 and the Justices to her right is foreclosed by the party-
favoring restrictions in place. Within the subset of Justices 1 through 5, 
Justice 3 is the “Median” Justice, and therefore, by playing off Justices 1 
and 2 against Justices 4 and 5, Justice 3’s rule of 150 days will be the one 
expressed in the Court’s opinion, rather than the view of Justice 5, the 
median Justice of the full Court. 
Thus, an immediate implication of MMJ theory is that in 5-4 decisions, 
when the five liberals carry the day, Justice 3 controls the opinion. But in 5-
4 decisions where the five conservatives control, Justice 7 controls the 
opinion. Thus, a small change in facts can produce a big change in outcome. 
In our example, if the defendant’s parking ticket had been eighty-five days 
overdue instead of only seventy, and Justice 5 wanted the government to 
win, the doctrine would shift from 150 days (Justice 3) to only forty days 
(Justice 7).85 
In this theory, the Median continues to be important because we need to 
know whether the facts are on one side, or the other, of the Median, as the 
position of the facts determines whether the median of the liberals or 
median of the conservatives controls the outcome and the rule established 
by the Court. 
This theory is clearly at odds with what Justices say they do. The Justices 
claim that they do not take cases to effect justice to individuals, but rather to 
make rules to guide all of the lower federal courts.86 If that were true, and all 
that Justices truly care about is the chosen doctrine, then the MJ model 
might most accurately describe Court opinion-making. But Justices might, 
in fact, care about more than chosen doctrine, and if so the MMJ model 
might be closer to the observed truth. 
                                                                                                                            
85. Cameron et al., supra note 76, at 1845.  
86. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 269 (1991). 
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B. Theories Focusing on the Authoring Justice 
Several theories give a central role to the Justice who authors the 
opinion. They differ greatly in their structure, however. 
1. Author Dominance87 
This theory asserts that the holdings expressed in the Court’s opinion are 
dictated by the views of the authoring Justice. Author Dominance Theory is 
the outcome of one or more distinct models of aggregating individual 
Justices’ desires into a Court outcome. Such models include where the 
Court operates under a “first and final offer” bargaining structure88 or where 
the opinion author had much, much lower costs of writing an opinion. Other 
models may contribute to this outcome, as well. All such models have their 
roots in the “attitudinal model” of Segal and Spaeth.89 
The predictions of the Author Dominance Theory are parasitic on the 
underlying model that predicts Author Dominance as an outcome. In 
addition, as Cameron, Park and Biem point out, opinion assignment 
becomes the crucial determinant of Court outcome.90 
2. Entry Deterring 
A more sophisticated author-centered theory of Court behavior is found 
in the Entry Deterring Theory of Lax and Cameron.91 This theory 
emphasizes, among other things, the different costs that the Justices have in 
writing opinions. Under this theory, the authoring Justice can write an 
opinion that deviates from the median Justice, or from the majority median 
Justice, but is still accepted as the Court’s opinion by moving just far 
enough away from the MJ/MMJ position that no other Justice wants to 
incur the cost of writing an opinion that will woo enough Justices to become 
controlling. Thus, by paying close attention to the costs of rivals, and by 
picking exactly the right position, a Justice can deter entry (into the opinion-
                                                                                                                            
87. See Cameron et al., supra note 76, at 1847 (calling this “Monopoly Author”).  
88. HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 76, at 111.  
89. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
90. Charles Cameron et al., Shaping Supreme Court Policy Through Appointments: The 
Impact of a New Justice, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1820, 1848 (2009). 
91. Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the 
Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276, 288 (2007). 
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writing “market”) by another Justice. In this regard, their theory resembles 
“limit pricing” by a monopolist in industrial organization theory.92 
Under the Entry Deterrence Theory, the Court’s opinion must lie 
between the ideal point of the opinion’s author and the median Justice, or 
the majority median Justice, depending on the underlying model. 
3. Clustering and Other Complex Theories 
If Justices were to care about the impact of their opinions, and if the 
impact of an opinion were to rise with the number of Justices who joined 
the opinion, Justices would tend to try to write opinions that could attract a 
large number of joins. In spite of Justice Brennan’s famous joke that a 
Justice need only be able to “count to five,”93 under Clustering Theory,94 
there are gains for a Justice who is able to count all the way to nine. A 
Justice who is contemplating writing an opinion that deviates from his own 
ideal point will be tempted to write in the direction of clusters of judges, so 
as to gain more votes.95 
Cameron and Kornhauser’s conception of Clustering Theory 
characterizes Judges as caring about many different variables, such as the 
impact of their opinions, the doctrinal rule chosen, the furtherance of justice 
in the individual case, and the costs of writing opinions.96 One can regard 
Clustering as a combination of other theories, but with an added factor, 
impact. As with any theory that has a lot of moving parts, it is difficult to 
get predictions from Clustering Theory without using specific values for at 
least some of the parameters. In this vein, Cameron, Park and Beim report 
that for cases involving “moderate” costs of writing opinions, “not 
overwhelming” importance of case impact,97 and no value on doing 
                                                                                                                            
92. MARK HIRSCHEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 563–65 (2008). 
93. SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICE 119 (2007), quoting Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 
111 HARV. L. REV. 29, 32 (1997). 
94. An empirical precursor to Clustering Theory exists, but it is limited to same-President 
appointments. See Stefanie A. Lindquist et al., The Impact of Presidential Appointments to the 
U.S. Supreme Court: Cohesive and Divisive Voting Within Presidential Blocs, 53 POL. RES. Q. 
795, 795 (2000). 
95. Charles Cameron et al., Shaping Supreme Court Policy Through Appointments: The 
Impact of a New Justice, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1820, 1851–52 (2009); Kornhauser, supra note 83, 
at 442. 
96. Charles Cameron & Lewis Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts (3): Adjudication 
Equilibria 12 (Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, New York University School 
of Law, Working Paper No. 09-39, 2009). 
97. They term this value “clarity.” Cameron et al., supra note 76, at 1852 n.108. 
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individual justice (thus eliminating the MMJ branch of the underlying 
theory), Clustering Theory pushes extreme Justices to write opinions that 
are much more moderate than their ideal. Moderate Justices, in contrast, can 
write opinions much closer to their ideal, as they can get joins from Justices 
to their left or right. 
Other hybrid models exist. Bonneau et al.98 produce a formal model 
combining author preferences, MJ theory, and strategic opinion assignment. 
Schwartz’s model99 combines author preferences with costs and opinion 
quality. The models are complex and impressive, but for our purposes there 
is one central similarity that drives our paper: over time, the Court’s 
holdings will tend to move in the direction of the change in the median 
Justice. 
III. COMPUTER SIMULATION OF THE NOMINATION PROCESS 
A. Modeling the Justice Selection Process100 
When a vacancy occurs, a new Justice must be chosen. The well-known 
process spelled out in the Constitution—nomination by President and 
confirmation by a majority of the Senate101—frames analysis of the choice. 
The President has a set of possible nominees, and he appraises each of the 
possible nominees for the possible effect of their appointments on the 
Court’s doctrinal outcomes.102 To do this well, a President would first need 
to know about the individual characteristics of each nominee, particularly 
the nominee’s ideology and intelligence. But two other criteria, not peculiar 
to a nominee’s individual characteristics, also bear on the President’s 
choices.  
First, the President would like to know which (if any) of the five theories 
listed above (Median Justice, Majority Median Justice, Author Dominance, 
                                                                                                                            
98. Chris W. Bonneau et al., Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the Majority 
Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 890, 890, 903 (2007). 
99. See generally Schwartz, supra note 81. 
100. Our simulation does not require that we take a position on whether the nomination and 
confirmation processes “cause” dissenting opinions on the Court. See Brian Goff, Supreme 
Court Consensus and Dissent: Estimating the Role of the Selection Screen, 127 PUB. CHOICE 
375, 387–88 (2006) (arguing for this hypothesis). 
101. Judicial Nominations and Confirmations, SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/judicial.cfm (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
102. CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC SELECTION: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION OF 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES FROM HERBERT HOOVER THROUGH GEORGE W. BUSH 30–32 (2007). 
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Entry Deterring, or Clustering) most accurately describes how the views of 
Justices affect the opinions published by the Court. Each theory posits a 
different means by which this effect is produced, and therefore, since the 
President cares about doctrinal outcomes, understanding how outcomes will 
result is important. Finding the correct theory is not, however, as crucial as 
it might seem. All of the theories suggest, at least weakly, that a President 
should strive to appoint a new Justice whose ideology is as close to his own 
as he can manage. The different theories diverge as to how important this is. 
Under the Median Justice Theory, a new appointment that does not move 
the median is, at least in the short run, irrelevant. In contrast, under Author 
Dominance Theory, the appointment may be extremely important. And the 
other three theories—Majority Median Justice, Entry Deterrence, and 
Clustering—all predict that such an appointment may have large effects. 
Second, as we discussed in the Introduction, the President would like to 
know which of the possible nominees will likely be confirmed by the 
Senate (“confirmability”). Most Senators will have preferences about 
doctrine, and will also appraise a nominee by his or her likely effect on 
Court doctrinal outcomes. The Senators’ preferences will be expressed 
through Senate process and norms, including the filibuster and the sixty 
votes for cloture required to end it.103 Some candidates will likely make it 
through this process and be confirmed, while others will not.104  
The President will thus seek to nominate a new Justice who can be 
confirmed and who will best affect Court doctrine in a way that pleases the 
President. These two goals, in a nutshell, frame the strategic problem that 
confronts the President when a seat on the Court opens up. 
As noted in the Introduction, the President’s nomination decision is 
influenced by other criteria. These include rewarding friends who have 
worked hard for him or for his party during difficult elections; valuing 
experiences, whether on the bench or in other contexts;105 and giving 
important constituencies, such as racial and ethnic groups and women, a 
                                                                                                                            
103. RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32878, CLOTURE ATTEMPTS ON 
NOMINATIONS: DATA AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 1–2 (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32878.pdf. 
104.  See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 71, at 85–116 (explaining the history of 
confirmations). 
105.  Chief Justice Taft famously served as President before he joined the Court. William 
Howard Taft, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/williamhowardtaft 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014). State supreme court service is increasingly unacceptable and 
considered an insufficient qualification for appointment to the federal courts. See Kathleen A. 
Bratton & Rorie L. Spill, Moving Up the Judicial Ladder: The Nomination of State Supreme 
Court Justices to the Federal Courts, 32 AM. POL. RES. 198, 198–99 (2004). 
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representative appointment.106 For purposes of our exercise, however, we 
will concentrate on the first consideration—Court doctrinal outcomes—and 
leave the others for discussion at the end. 
Most, if not all, recent models of appointing Justices to the Court107 
presume that both the President and the Senate believe in the Median 
Justice Theory of Court behavior. We will initially follow Krehbiel’s model 
in our simulation. He sets out a four-stage model108 in which a vacancy 
opens up on the Court, the President proposes a new Justice, the Senate 
confirms or does not confirm, and then the Court (with or without the new 
Justice) votes and decides a case. 
The last stage—voting on the Court—requires discussion of the effects 
of a failure to appoint. A fully-staffed Court is comprised of an odd number 
of Justices, nine, so under the Median Justice model the outcome is always 
determined by a specific median Justice, Justice 5. So, if the Senate 
confirms the nominee, the outcome of the vote is the ideal point of the 
median Justice. But what happens if the nominee is not confirmed? The 
Court then consists of eight members, and the median is the interval 
between the fourth and fifth Justices (when they are arrayed in order of 
ideology). However, Court norms require a majority to significantly modify 
any existing Court precedent.109 On an eight-member Court, this requires at 
least five votes out of eight, the same number required even if the ninth 
Justice had not left the Court. Thus, following Krehbiel, we will assume that 
the presence of an eight-member Court will not significantly affect whether 
                                                                                                                            
106.  The last consideration has become so significant that, as of the time of this article, 
there are no white Anglo-Saxon Protestants on the Court. Of the six men who are on the court, 
one is African-American (Thomas), one is Jewish (Breyer), and five are Catholic (Kennedy, 
Scalia, Roberts, Alito, Thomas). Of the three women, one is Hispanic Catholic (Sotomayor), 
and the other two are Jewish (Kagan, Ginsburg). See Roberts Court, OYEZ,  
http://www.oyez.org/courts/robt6 (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). 
107. Keith Krehbiel, Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game, 51 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 231, 232–33 (2007); Bryon J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme 
Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
1069, 1072 (1999); David W. Rohde & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Advising and Consenting in the 60-
Vote Senate: Strategic Appointments to the Supreme Court, 69 J. POL. 664, 666 (2007). 
Compare Susan K. Snyder & Barry R. Weingast, The American System of Shared Powers: The 
President, Congress, and the NLRB, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 269, 271–73 (2000) (discussing a 
median-centered analysis of appointments to the NLRB), with Randall L. Calvert et al., A 
Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 591 (1989) 
(exploring an early model without a multimember voting body). 
108. Krehbiel deems his model a three-stage model because the first stage is purely 
random, with no strategic element. Krehbiel, supra note 107, at 233. 
109. Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 643, 646 (2002). 
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existing precedent is changed.110 Or, more precisely, we assume that the 
President and Senate will make this assumption, and propose a nominee and 
vote accordingly. 
In the previous stage, where the Senate is deciding whether to confirm, 
there are many possible veto pivots. We model a pivot in the Senate. This 
could be the voter who must be satisfied to vote for cloture. In this case, 
there can be no more than forty Senators who are unhappy enough with the 
nomination to vote against it. Or, the pivot could be the median of the 
majority party. In our simulation, it does not matter how the pivot comes 
about, only that the pivot exists. In the sections below we will discuss 
relaxing this assumption. 
The President will nominate the “best” candidate, from his perspective, 
that the Senate—which will be identical to the pivot in the initial version of 
the simulation—will confirm. If the President is a Republican, he will 
nominate a fifty year old.111 If the President is a Democrat, he will nominate 
a 50+X year old, where X will vary from one simulation to another. 
Because our simulation presumes that the President is certain about 
Senators’ preferences and the rules of the Senate, and would therefore only 
nominate candidates certain to be confirmed, every nomination will be 
confirmed. 
B. Modeling Justice Retirements/Appointment Opportunities 
The simulation features Justices leaving the Court on a random basis in 
every year, where the departure probability is a function of age. Statistical 
literature refers to the age dependence as duration dependence.112 The 
simplest duration model that allows for negative duration dependence—i.e., 
that retirement rates increase with age—is the Weibull distribution.113 The 
Weibull distribution’s two parameters are referred to as the shape parameter 
                                                                                                                            
110. Significant relative to a full nine-member Court—of course, eight-member Courts can 
change precedent if one opinion receives five votes. 
111. Thus, we are implicitly assuming that the net of all of the tradeoffs discussed in the 
Introduction to this article, where Republicans are giving a fairly heavy weight to age, produces 
fifty-year-old Republican appointees.  
112. See Robert J. Willis, Comment, in THE YOUTH LABOR MARKET PROBLEM: ITS 
NATURE, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES 386, 388 (Richard B. Freeman & David A. Wise eds., 
1982).  
113. See Stephen Machin & Alan Manning, The Causes and Consequences of Longterm 
Unemployment in Europe, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS: VOLUME 3C 3085, 3099 (Orley 
C. Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999). 
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and scale parameter.114 Unfortunately, unlike with the more typical normal 
(also referred to as the Gaussian) distribution, these parameters only 
indirectly determine the mean and variance of the expected retirement 
ages.115 The values of the parameters in the simulation were chosen to 
closely match the observed tenure profile on the Court accounting only for 
age of the Justice. 
It is, of course, possible to allow the retirement decision be a function of 
any observable characteristics, such as to allow for differences for male and 
female Justices or for the degree of a replacement nominee’s 
partisanship/ideological position. In fact, controlling for these other 
observables would allow us to improve a very naïve model of strategic 
retirement; we would allow the retirement probability to vary with the 
current political configuration of the President and Senate as well as the 
Justice’s own ideology. However, since we currently have only a small set 
of observed Justice retirements from which to build this improved 
retirement model, we would want to be careful not to over-parameterize the 
retirement decision. 
As a first step, we chose a simple parameterization that highlights the 
importance of age of appointees in shaping the ideological distribution of 
the Court. More complex retirement models may be incorporated into 
subsequent studies. 
C. Modeling Presidential and Senatorial Elections 
Since our primary interest is in the appointment process of Justices, the 
simulation incorporates a very simple model of elections. Presidents are 
elected every four years. We model this by drawing the ideal point of the 
President every fourth year as a uniform random variable over the policy 
space, [-1, 1]. We will assume (without loss of generality) that negative 
values are associated with Democratic Presidents. Similarly, instead of 
drawing all Senators at each election, we will just draw the cut point of the 
pivotal once again as a uniform random variable over the policy space. As 
we noted above, this pivot could be the median of the full Senate, or the 
median of the majority party, or the filibuster pivot depending on one’s 
theory of Senate politics. Our simulation is consistent with any model that 
has only a single pivotal player in the Senate.  
                                                                                                                            
114. BRYAN DODSON & DENNIS NOLAN, RELIABILITY ENGINEERING HANDBOOK 59 (1999). 
115. In fact, there is no closed for solution for the mean of the Weibull distribution; it is 
defined by the Gamma function of the two parameters.  
  
 
 
 
68 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
This model of elections is clearly overly simplistic and not realistic. 
However, by doing many simulations with different draws, we are 
integrating out the uncertainty induced by a particular choice of politicians. 
By allowing for uniform distributions, we are evaluating the constitutional 
appointment process from an ex ante perspective allowing for any future 
political configuration, including ones that, given the current political 
climate, seem unlikely. This is a standard approach in the literature 
examining electoral rules, since in the very long run we do not know the 
likely political preferences that will be run through the game induced by the 
Constitution.116 
There are other possible modeling choices. For example, we could take 
historically-observed election results as a valid sample of all possible 
political outcomes. We could then sample from this set, somewhat akin to a 
statistical bootstrap, to generate our simulation runs.117 Of course, we need 
to make the strong assumption that the political results of the past 
accurately represent all possible future sets. In the near-term, this 
assumption is plausible, but it seems less tenable as we move out a century. 
D. Simulation Summary 
Since there are several moving parts to the simulation, it is worth 
recapping the setup.  
 
1. Draw the initial ideal points for the President and for the Senate 
pivot from a uniform distribution on [-1,1]. 
 
2. Draw the initial configuration of the nine Justices’ ideal points from 
a uniform distribution on [-1, 1] and initial ages of Justices from a 
Normal distribution with a mean of sixty-five and standard deviation 
of nine.118 
 
                                                                                                                            
116. See, e.g., DAN S. FELSENTHAL & MOSHÉ MACHOVER, THE MEASUREMENT OF VOTING 
POWER: THEORY AND PRACTICE, PROBLEMS AND PARADOXES 263–74 (1998). 
117. This is the approach used by Andrew Gelman in two of his articles. See Andrew 
Gelman et al., The Mathematics and Statistics of Voting Power, 17 STAT. SCI. 420, 427 (2002); 
Andrew Gelman et al., Standard Voting Power Indexes Do Not Work: An Empirical Analysis, 
34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 657, 658 (2004). 
118. The starting ages are arbitrary, but the results are not sensitive to the choice 
parameters. After 100 years, the initial age distribution will have no impact. 
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3. We then start the simulation. Each iteration corresponds to a year in 
our model. In each period we calculate the probability of retirement 
(or death) from a Weibull distribution with location parameter (often 
referred to as α) of seventy-five and shape parameter (often referred 
to as ρ) of four for each Justice. The probability randomly 
determines retirement. 
 
4. If there is a vacancy, the replacement is determined from the 
equilibrium, described by Krehbiel,119 between the President and the 
Senate pivot player. Note that the players’ ideal points determine the 
location of the new Justice on the Court. The age of the appointee 
depends on whether the President is a Democrat (with negative ideal 
point) or Republican. 
 
5. We then increment the age of every sitting Justice and every fourth 
period redraw the President and Senate cutpoint. 
 
6. We continue the simulation for 100 periods (years) and note the 
location of the median Justice. Then we restart from 1. We typically 
draw 50,000 simulations of the 100 periods. To summarize the 
results we average, for each difference in age between Democratic 
and Republican appointees, the 50,000 simulations of the location of 
the median Justice in period 100, and report the average. 
 
This simulation should demonstrate how differences in initial age at 
appointment for Democrats and Republicans affect the extent to which the 
median position of the Court moves after 100 years.  
E. Results 
To measure the effects of our model, we compare the results of the 
simulation, where Republican Presidents nominate fifty-year-olds and 
Democratic Presidents nominate sixty-year-olds, to a control run where 
Presidents of both parties nominate fifty-year-olds.120 The simulation is 
symmetric, so that it does not matter which party nominates younger 
candidates, as this would only affect the sign (positive/negative) of the drift.  
                                                                                                                            
119. Krehbiel, supra note 107, at n.2. 
120. Note that we could have added some noise to the age of initial appointment, but since 
we will be averaging, this would not change the results at all. 
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Figure 4 graphs out the median of the Court in each period of the 
simulation, as averaged over the 50,000 runs, providing a very good 
estimate of the expected median (which is a highly non-linear function of 
the game). First, we see that for the control run, featuring no age difference 
at appointment, the expected median hovers around zero. This is as 
expected because in this case everything is symmetric.  
However, when we turn to the model featuring Republicans appointing 
Justices that are ten years younger, we see in the long run a clear rightward 
drift in the median in what is otherwise a totally symmetric model. The 
intuition for this finding is simple: Republican appointees (with positive 
ideal points) stay on the court longer. Although the scale of the policy space 
makes this look like a small difference, the expected median has moved 
about 3% of the distance of the policy space by year 80.  
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Figure 4: Comparison of the Court’s median ideal point averaged over the simulation 
runs for no age difference at appoint versus 10 years. 
 
Not just the mean has changed. Figure 5, a graph of density plots of the 
medians in the final year of the simulation (year 100), illustrates not only 
the rightward shift we saw in the graph of the means, but an increase in 
variance by 25%. Again, this is happening because with longer tenures, the 
vacancy profile becomes noisier, allowing the median to move around 
somewhat more.  
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Figure 5: Density plot of the medians in the final year of the simulation (year 100) 
across the 50,000 runs of the simulation.  
 
We must compare not only an age differential of zero versus ten years, 
but also how other age differentials lead to predicted changes in the Court 
median. These comparisons are shown in Figure 6. We run our simulation 
varying age differentials between two years and twenty, which is larger than 
any we have observed. The dots in the figure represent the mean of the 
medians across the simulation runs. The expected rightward drift is linear in 
the age differential. The picture is not perfectly linear because 50,000 runs 
of the simulations are not quite enough to average out some slightly odd 
cases given the non-linearities in the model.  
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Figure 6: Graph of expected medians in final year as a function of age difference at 
initial appointment.  
 
At the extremes of the graph, the age differential is moving the Court 4% 
of the policy space to the right. Even if we look at more reasonable values -- 
around eight years, there is still a fair bit of rightward shift.  
Next, we will model what occurs without the Senate—that is, what 
occurs if the President could appoint new Justices without the need for 
Senate confirmation. We ran a simulation without the need for Senate 
confirmation, but identical in every other way. We find that, with a ten-year 
disparity between Democratic and Republican appointees, the median 
moves far more quickly than with Senate confirmation. Without the need to 
appease the Senate, and hence assess for the criteria of confirmability, the 
President’s dominant strategy will be to appoint a new Justice whose 
ideological views match the President’s ideal point. 
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Figure 7: Comparison of simulated median with a 10 year age differential with and 
without the need for Senate confirmation. 
  
Note that, without the need for Senate confirmation, in the first twenty 
years of the simulation, Republican Presidents can move the Court median 
to the right very quickly when compared to where Senate confirmation is 
required. The Senate, in other words, is quite effective at damping out the 
effect of the President’s preferred ideological views, at least at first. 
Eventually, the relentless logic of older Democratic appointments moves 
the median in the Republican direction even when Senate approval is 
needed. 
The vertical difference between the median without Senate confirmation 
and with Senate confirmation provides some measure of the returns to 
strategic retirements, that is, the retirement of Justices when the party which 
most aligns with their ideology controls the Presidency and the Senate, so 
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the retiring Justice’s chosen successor will more likely align with the 
retiring Justice’s views. The larger the difference, the greater the returns to 
avoiding the checking value of the Senate, which is one of the purposes of 
strategic retirement.121 This simulation shows how important strategic 
retirement can be to the party that chooses older Justices. 
Are these results “significant?” We suspect so, based on the following 
exercise. If we look at the Martin and Quinn scores122 for the ideal points of 
the Justices, starting in 1937, and track the score of the median justice from 
term-to-term, the variation in the median is approximately 4%. Our 
simulations suggest that a substantial difference in the age of nominees 
between the two parties can produce a drift equal to 3%. But this 3% figure 
is a computation of the drift comparing what happens when the parties 
behave identically to when only one party starts appointing older Justices. It 
is equally plausible to argue that, in determining the significance of the 
drift, the pertinent comparison should be to what results when the roles of 
the parties are fully reversed. If the Democrats are currently appointing 
older Justices, then perhaps the proper comparison should be to the drift that 
results were the Republicans to appoint older Justices. If this is the pertinent 
comparison, then the drift is closer to 6%. In any event, this is in the same 
general size as the drift we find, on average, between terms, and is 
systematic. 
Of course, these comparisons are just suggestive. The Martin and Quinn 
scores are computed from the observed votes of the Justices on cases that 
they have chosen strategically. In addition, there is no way to calibrate 
precisely the imposed scale of ideology to the scale we utilize in our 
simulations. Nonetheless, if one thinks it worthwhile to pay attention to 
Martin and Quinn scores—and we most certainly do—then it is important to 
pay attention to our results. The drift that our simulation produces is large 
enough to compare to observed term-to-term movements on the Supreme 
Court.  
                                                                                                                            
121. Michael A. Bailey & Albert Yoon, ‘While There’s a Breath in My Body’: The 
Systemic Effects of Politically Motivated Retirement from the Supreme Court, 23 J. 
THEORETICAL POL. 293, 301–02 (2011). 
122. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin A. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND ADJACENT LITERATURE 
A. Proposals for Fixed Eighteen-Year Terms for Justices 
Our simulation may implicate several key policy issues. One very 
important issue is the proposal, backed by many law professors and 
important lawyers, to replace life tenure on the Supreme Court with one 
fixed, staggered eighteen-year term for each Justice, without the possibility 
of re-appointment.123 Such a change would require an appointment to the 
Court every two years, thus ensuring that every President will enjoy the 
opportunity to appoint two Justices. This movement has culminated, thus 
far, with a letter to Vice President Joseph Biden and Attorney General Eric 
Holder (among others) urging the passage of a constitutional amendment 
making just such a change.124 Public intellectuals from across the political 
spectrum, from Frank Michelman and Judith Resnik on the left to Lino 
Graglia and Steven Calabresi on the right, actively support the effort to 
move to staggered eighteen-year terms.125 In short, the working assumption 
of those supporting the movement seems to be that this is a nonpartisan and 
nonpolitical suggestion. As noted by Roger C. Cramton and Paul 
Carrington, in reference to the impressive list of people supporting this 
Court reform proposal, “[i]nformed readers will recognize that this list 
includes persons of almost every imaginable political orientation.”126  
Significant literature provides reasons for the proposed constitutional 
amendment.127 Although the following list necessarily does not completely 
account for the complex and extensive literature on the topic, the chief 
arguments made in the pro-amendment literature are: 
                                                                                                                            
123. E.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Steven G. Calabresi, Term Limits for the High Court, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 9, 2002, at A23, available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/2002Term.pdf. 
124. See Carrington, supra note 68. 
125. Id.; Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 69, at 831. 
126. REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 69, at 7; see also Calabresi & Lindgren, supra 
note 69, at 831 n.199 (“Indeed, the diversity of political and jurisprudential viewpoints of the 
various commentators we follow demonstrates the nonpartisan nature of our proposal.”). 
127. REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 69; see Daniel J. Meador, Thinking About Age and 
Supreme Court Tenure, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 
115, 117–20 (R.C. Cramton & P.D. Carrington eds., 2006); Robert F. Nagel, Limiting the Court 
by Limiting Life Tenure, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES 127, 127–30 (R.C. Cramton & P.D. Carrington eds., 2006); Sanford Levinson, 
Contempt of Court: The Most Important ‘Contemporary Challenge to Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 339, 341–42 (1992); Calabresi & Lindgren supra note 69, at 831–42; Powe, Jr., supra 
note 74, at 112–13. 
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Justices are staying on the Court longer than they used to. The 
watershed seems to be approximately 1970. The average tenure on 
the Court is now more than twenty-five years, which is more than 
ten years longer than our experience prior to 1970.128 The long 
period on the Court erodes conventional legal skills.129 
 
As a consequence of Justices staying on the Court longer than they 
used to, the Justices are older than they used to be. The increase in 
age produces more frequent cases of physical and mental 
decrepitude.130 
 
The Justices, as a consequence of being on the Court longer, and 
being older, are less in touch and less in step with the concerns and 
politics of the day than they used to be.131  
 
Confirmation hearings are much more politicized due to the 
infrequent and uncertain appointments.132  
 
Almost no other democratic government has chosen lifetime 
appointments for its judges.133 
 
What does our work bring to this literature? First, and with some 
apologies, we inject a bit of politics into the analysis. Our analysis shows 
                                                                                                                            
128. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 69, at 779. Much of the Calabresi & Lindgren article 
focuses on a critique of Stras & Scott’s critique of previous work by Calabresi & Lindgren. For 
purposes of our article, it is clear that the literature accepts that Justices are staying on the Court 
longer than they used to. 
129. Saikrishna B. Prakash, America’s Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J. 541, 569 (1999); John O. 
McGinnis, Justice Without Justices, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 541, 543 (1999). But see Meador, 
supra note 127, at 130 (illustrating the author’s skepticism).  
130. David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical Case 
for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995, 995 (2000); Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 
69, at 816; Powe, Jr., supra note 74, at 102–03. 
131. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 69, at 811–12.  
132. Id. at 813–14. Many of the commentators complain that the process has become too 
politicized. See Gerald Walpin, Take Obstructionism Out of the Judicial Nominations Process, 8 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 89, 90. But see Steven G. Calabresi, Advice to the Next Conservative 
President of the United States, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 369, 377–78 (2001) (arguing for 
more intense politics). Others point out that it is hard to understand what this argument means, 
apart from noting intense opposition to one’s preferred nominee. Farnsworth, supra note 74, at 
414. Meador is skeptical about this argument. Meador, supra note 127, at 128. 
133. Powe, Jr., supra note 74, at 101; Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 69, at 819. 
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that this reform proposal is not exactly the politically neutral suggestion that 
it appears to be on the surface. Instead, rotating, fixed eighteen-year terms 
are likely to move the median Justice towards the left, though this may be 
back towards the center of the political spectrum. This result is the product 
of the assumptions on which our calculations rest, particularly the 
differential on the basis of party in the age of appointees to the Court. But, 
as we demonstrated, this assumption rests on a reasonably-firm historical 
basis. 
The impact of term limits can be seen in Figure 8, which charts the 
results of re-running our simulation incorporating the ten-year age 
differential, but both with and without an eighteen-year term limit for 
Justices. In order to model term limits, rather than draw their term directly 
from the initial age of the Justices, we drew their term as a uniform 
distribution (with mass only on the integers) on the interval [1,17]. We 
added their term to the age of appointment, fifty for Republicans and sixty 
for Democrats, to back out their ages. This will only alter the initial few 
years of the simulation after which all of the first Justices are off the court. 
We are also averaging over a large number of simulations, dampening the 
impact of the initial points. 
As we can see from Figure 8, imposing eighteen-year term limits 
dramatically moves the expected median to the left. The difference does not 
reach zero, as was the case with the no age differential case we saw in 
Figure 4, but the difference is not far from zero. This conclusion is subject 
to several caveats. First, and most importantly, we assumed that the 
imposition of term limits does not alter the retirement decision of a Justice. 
This would be the case where, for example, a Justice in her seventeenth year 
on the Court might want to serve her final year even if the retirement model 
implied by the Weibull model indicated that she would retire. We also 
assume that the imposition of term limits does not alter the appointment 
politics between the President and the Senate, which could occur since 
likely vacancies would be more predictable. The differences could cut in 
either of two directions. On one hand, opposition party members in the 
Senate might stall confirmations, hoping to drag things out until a President 
of their party can make the nomination.134 On the other hand, some have 
                                                                                                                            
134. For example, appointees to vacancies on the National Labor Relations Board and the 
Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve have had their confirmations stalled. See Hans 
Nichols & Holly Rosenkrantz, Obama Bypasses Senate, Makes Appointments to NLRB, 
Treasury, BUS. WK. (March 28, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aKr_AXeeC82k; Robert 
Schroeder, Stalled Fed Nominee Shares Economics Nobel, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 11, 2010, 2:48 
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suggested that the certainty of having a new seat to fill every two years will 
lead Senators to be less contentious and overtly political during 
confirmation hearings.135 Finally, the imposition of term limits imposes 
even more non-linearities in the model. This can be seen by the seemingly 
random movement in the graph. It is likely that with a larger set of 
simulations, the graph would be linear when we averaged. The qualitative 
findings, however, would remain unchanged.  
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PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/stalled-fed-nominee-shares-economics-nobel-2010-
10-11. 
135. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 69, at 814–15. 
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Do we predict that Republicans will immediately stop and withdraw 
support for the fixed eighteen-year term once they read this paper? No, 
because ideological disposition competes with the other above-listed 
considerations. Consider, for example, mental and physical decrepitude. 
Assume, for purposes of this analysis, that a system of fixed eighteen-year 
terms will result in younger, sharper, more energetic Justices than we have 
at present. A Republican will have to compare the ideological disposition of 
the Court under present circumstances—older, duller, and weaker but more 
conservative—with the presumably younger, sharper and more energetic, 
but more liberal (or centrist) Court afforded by the eighteen-year term 
proposal. To a Republican assessing the proposal, the favorable shift in 
youth, mental acuity, and energy afforded by the proposal may offset the 
unfavorable shift in ideological disposition of the Court. That the younger 
Justices are probably more in touch with the politics of the day further 
complicates the Republican decision. Further, the simulation demonstrates 
the relationship between the size of the differential on the basis of party in 
the age of appointees to the Court and the location of the median Justice. A 
Republican would need some probability distribution function over the age 
differential in the future to assess his feelings about the fixed eighteen-year 
term for Supreme Court Justices. The multitude of considerations at play 
complicates predicting the preferences of Republicans. 
On the other hand, we feel comfortable that Democrats will continue to 
support the fixed eighteen-year term after reading our paper. For a 
Democrat, all considerations push in the same direction. 
B. Reasons for the Differential 
As we pointed out in the Introduction, when a President chooses a 
nominee for a vacancy on the Supreme Court, he must trade off between 
several criteria: confirmability, intelligence and legal ability,136 experience, 
ideological similarity to the President, constituent desires, paying off 
political favors, and age. Hence, age emerges from a complex, multifactor 
balancing process. However, age can move the median, which is crucial to 
the Court’s behavior.137 
                                                                                                                            
136. See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 62, at 1436 (discussing the difficulties in measuring 
judicial quality). 
137. This basic point is not new. Many commentators have noted the incentive to appoint 
young Justices. Powe, Jr., supra note 74, at 104; Farnsworth, supra note 74, at 424–28; 
Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 69, at 809. 
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Assuming that both the Democrats and Republicans are aware of the 
effect of age, why have the parties acted so differently? 
One possibility is that the age difference stems entirely from chance. 
Democrats and Republicans might similarly value the trade-offs inherent in 
appointing Justices, and random variance accounts for the age differential. 
The sample size is small, as there are very few appointments to the Supreme 
Court, and Democrats have been a bit unlucky in having fewer Justices to 
appoint than Republicans. If the difference is caused by chance, the 
difference will disappear given a sufficiently large sample size, as there is 
no reason to expect this state of affairs to continue. 
Although this explanation might be right, it is difficult to confirm, and 
might be wrong: Democrats might value youth less than Republicans do. 
We will explore several other explanations for why Democrats and 
Republicans act differently as to nominations. 
One explanation is that Democrats have a much higher discount rate than 
Republicans. In other words, Republicans care much more about the distant 
future than do Democrats, and are willing to accept younger, less-
accomplished nominees than are Democrats. Although this explanation is 
feasible, it leaves open a critical question: what accounts for the difference 
in discount rate? 
Alternatively, Democrats may have fewer degrees of freedom in 
choosing candidates. This explanation envisions the Democrats as a loose 
coalition of identified interest groups (women, African-Americans, 
Hispanics) of predominantly liberal views, all of whom want a 
representative from their own group appointed. A Democratic President, 
operating under these constraints, will have fewer degrees of freedom to 
exercise over his choice of nominee, particularly with respect to age. 
Democratic Presidents will be forced to nominate older candidates, on 
average, than Republican candidates will nominate. There is one main 
problem with this explanation: it fits poorly with recent history. The most 
recent two Democratic nominees, Justices Sotomayor (female Hispanic) and 
Kagan (female Jewish) were ages fifty-five and fifty, respectively, at the 
time of their nominations.138 Female Hispanics and female Jews would seem 
to be two categories that have the fewest degrees of freedom. In addition, 
one might also point out that Republicans are also a coalition, comprising 
social conservatives, fundamentalist Christians, libertarians, and fiscal 
conservatives. These groups do not cleave neatly along lines of race or sex, 
                                                                                                                            
138. Biography: Elena Kagan, OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/justices/elena_kagan (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2014); Biography: Sonia Sotomayor, OYEZ, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/sonia_sotomayor (last visited Jan. 23, 2014). 
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but have a strong group identity and view their coalition partners with some 
distrust. Our best guess is that the Republicans seem to have cut a deal 
between their coalition partners so that social conservatives determine 
Supreme Court nominations—Scalia, Alito, Roberts, Thomas, and 
Kennedy.139 In return, social conservatives have little influence on non-
judicial appointees, such as a Secretary of the Treasury. This explanation, if 
accurate, would explain why Republican Presidents enjoy more degrees of 
freedom to appoint younger Justices. 
A third explanation for the differential would focus on the bargaining 
positions and strategies of the players in the confirmation process. Perhaps 
Republicans and Democrats in the Senate respond differently to 
nominations by Presidents from the opposing party. In particular, perhaps 
Republicans are more serious about playing hardball politics with 
nominations by Democratic Presidents than Democratic Senators are with 
nominations by Republican Presidents. One might expect that there would 
be some interaction between the age of nominees and the intensity of the 
politics surrounding the nomination. More specifically, we might expect 
that the younger the nominee, the more intense the politics. After all, 
compromising on an older candidate gives away less; an older candidate 
will sooner leave office and open up the seat. If this were the case, then we 
might expect Democratic Presidents to nominate significantly older 
candidates (Breyer, Ginsburg) when facing a Republican Senate than when 
facing a Democratic Senate (Sotomayor, Kagan).140 In contrast, Republican 
Presidents facing Democratic Senates might have no similar reason to 
compromise on age. 
Testing this third explanation would be extremely difficult. To generate 
concrete predictions about the difference in Republican and Democrat 
nominees as a consequence of the difference in confirmation politics, we 
would need to know, at a minimum, about the President’s and Senators’ 
relative discount rates and beliefs over future elections. Consider, for 
example, a situation where a Democratic President faces a Republican 
Senate, and consider the result of Democratic and Republican Senators’ 
beliefs about which party will hold the Presidency in the future. If both 
believe that Democrats will hold the Presidency in years to come, but 
Republicans are less certain that this will be true, Democrats may not feel 
                                                                                                                            
139. Some social conservatives would argue against characterizing Kennedy as sympathetic 
to their views. See Patti Waldmeir, Closet Liberals, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2005, 11:07 AM), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/db0a17ba-0616-11da-883e-00000e2511c8.html (discussing social 
conservatives’ disgusted reaction to Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas). 
140. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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that it is worthwhile to fight about whether a younger or an older Democrat 
is appointed. After all, when the current appointee leaves the Court he will 
likely be replaced by another Democrat. Republicans, however, may feel it 
is worth fighting about the age of the nominee, because they are not as 
certain that Democrats will be in power. Thus, we observe Republicans 
fighting harder than Democrats, particularly with a young nominee. And the 
intensity with which Republicans fight harder than Democrats should be a 
function of the difference in their beliefs about who will hold the 
Presidency. Differences in beliefs about which party will hold the Senate 
should also produce different willingness to fight over the age of nominees 
to the Court. Similarly, differential beliefs about the likelihood of 
retirements from the Court will produce different willingness to fight over 
the age of nominees. Lastly, to pull all of this together, we would have to 
know what are the relative discount rates of the parties—how much each 
party cares about the future, relative to the other—for all of the crucial 
players. Lacking good estimates of the parties’ beliefs and discount rates, 
we cannot generate the sort of predictions that are needed to produce a clean 
test. 
C. This Article’s Effects on the Differential 
This article may change the politics we observe. Democrats who read 
this article may realize, for the first time, the long-run effect of selecting 
older appointees, and alter their conduct to permit selection of younger 
appointees, possibly eliminating the age differential in the long run. Such a 
result would be made possible only if Democrats had sufficient degrees of 
freedom to alter their nomination choices, but the findings of this article 
may help Democrats secure the necessary degrees of freedom. For example, 
Democrats may decide to fight harder when Republicans nominate young 
Justices. Alternatively, Democratic Presidents may search harder for 
younger candidates, or persuade their coalition’s constituent groups that 
nominating a representative from the group should be less prioritized than 
nominating a younger liberal Justice. Thus, we do not expect the differential 
to last.141 
                                                                                                                            
141. The closest analog in the literature comes from the finance literature. Finance 
professors have, at times, noticed imperfections in the market upon which trading strategies can 
be built. Attempts to find the imperfections several years later may fail; traders read the article 
detailing the imperfection, trade on the strategy, and squeeze the imperfection out of the 
markets. Burton C. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 
59, 71–72 (2003). 
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This article may also affect support for the eighteen-year term limit 
proposal. Since this article demonstrates that the proposal would largely 
eliminate the effects of age on the median Justice, the article may prompt 
stronger support for the proposal from the left and a weakening of support 
for the proposal on the right. However, as discussed supra, even though the 
proposal hinders conservative influence on the Court, conservatives may 
support the proposal regardless because of the other benefits it would 
confer, such as less contentious confirmation hearings and a younger, more 
physically vigorous Court. 
D. Future Research 
Although our simulation, in its current state, yields useful insights into 
the Supreme Court appointment process, the models upon which the 
simulation are based heavily simplify the appointment process. Additional 
insights may be gleaned by modifying the models so they incorporate more 
complex assumptions regarding elections or retirement decisions of 
Justices. 
1. Elections 
Popular reaction to Court opinions may affect Presidential and Senatorial 
elections. This would likely happen when a Court opinion particularly 
pleases or displeases a segment of the electorate and candidates respond by 
running against or in favor of the Court or the issue that it raised. 
Significant research investigates the correlation of public opinion and the 
Court’s decisions.142 Egan and Citrin143 explore the effect of the Court’s 
decisions on views of the Court’s legitimacy, and find that general public 
opinion seldom follows Court decisions. Instead, conservative voters, but 
not liberal ones, regard the Court as less legitimate when it issues a decision 
with which they substantively disagree.144 
We could alter our election model to account for popular reaction to 
Court opinions and see if this alteration affects the movement of the median 
                                                                                                                            
142. E.g., Christopher J. Casillas et al., How Public Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 74, 74 (2010); VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS 30 (2003). 
143. Patrick J. Egan & Jack Citrin, Opinion Leadership, Backlash, and Delegitimation: 
Supreme Court Rulings and Public Opinion 6–7 (August 4, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
144. See Carrubba et al., supra note 80. 
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Justice. Altering the simulation so that the draws for the President and the 
Senate pivot depend on case rulings would, however, require that we model 
cases, an additional layer of complexity. As a substitute, we might make the 
draw depend on the distribution of Justices, but it is not clear how to 
implement that strategy. 
Other means of altering the election model are also possible. We could 
also alter the draws of the President and the Senate to resemble historical 
data. For example, we could start with some year, count the number of 
Democratic victories and Republican victories in the Presidential elections, 
and then use the relative number to model the chances of drawing a 
Republican or Democratic President. Such a technique would be very 
sensitive to the year in which we start. Thus, starting in 1968, we would get 
seven Republican victories and four Democratic victories.145 But starting in 
1960 would produce seven Republican and six Democratic victories.146 
In addition, we could alter the distribution function from which the 
President and Senate are drawn. The American political system does not 
commonly elect candidates from the ideological extremes. Thus, it might 
make sense to use a distribution function which puts more mass in the 
center than in the tails. Our working hypothesis is that this would reduce the 
movement of the median Justice from the center. 
2. Retirement Decisions 
The retirement decision model could be altered to account for the effects 
of strategic retirements. Bailey and Yoon147 investigate the role of strategic 
retirements in the context of a two-stage game, in an effort to get beyond 
the “I know it when I see it” form of analysis. Their effort is 
understandable; strategic retirements, or the lack thereof, on the Court can 
change the course of legal history. Consider, for example, the Jimmy Carter 
era and the failure of both William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall to 
retire from the Court, thus denying President Carter and a Democratic 
Senate the chance to appoint their replacements. Marshall, in particular, was 
openly requested to retire:  
                                                                                                                            
145. The seven Republican victories occurred in 1968 (Nixon), 1972 (Nixon), 1980 
(Reagan), 1984 (Reagan), 1988 (Bush, Sr.), 2000 (Bush, Jr.), and 2004 (Bush, Jr.). The four 
Democratic victories occurred in 1976 (Carter), 1992 (Clinton), 1996 (Clinton), and 2008 
(Obama). 
146. Democratic candidates won in 1960 (Kennedy) and 1964 (Johnson). 
147. See Bailey & Yoon, supra note 121, at 294. 
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In 1979, [Marshall] says, two White House aides called him and 
suggested that he quickly quit the court so President Jimmy Carter 
could name a new justice. The aides reminded Marshall of his 
heart attack, his difficulties with blood clots and his bouts of 
pneumonia. They painted a sad picture of the possible 
replacements that a Republican like Ronald Reagan might select 
for the court. The justice slammed the phone down. But that didn’t 
stop it.
148
  
Marshall, who was seventy-one years old at the time of the White House 
call,149 did not retire until 1991, when he was forced to do so because of ill 
health.150 President Bush appointed, as his successor, Clarence Thomas. The 
resulting Court had Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist on the right, 
leaving either Justices Kennedy or O’Connor as the median Justice.151 
Consider an alternative history. If Justice Marshall had agreed to retire 
(instead of slamming the phone down), President Carter might well have 
been able to appoint a fifty-five-year-old who was as liberal as Justice 
Stevens in 1979. If this had happened, the new Justice would have been 
only sixty-seven years old in 1991. There would likely have been no 
appointment for President Bush. In this alternative history, the median 
Justice likely would have been Byron White or Harry Blackmun. If the 
Median Justice Theory is correct, this would have produced only a small 
move to the left. But if the Median Majority Justice Theory is correct, this 
may well have produced a massive move to the left. Under the Median 
Majority Justice Theory, the median of Justices Souter, Stevens, Blackmun, 
White and new Justice would have controlled the opinion. That Justice 
would be the most liberal of Souter, Blackmun, and White. In short, a 
strategic retirement by Marshall may have made a significant difference in 
the ideology expressed in the Court’s opinions. 
We could program a strategic retirement as a higher probability of 
voluntary retirement when a Justice who was appointed by a Republican (or 
                                                                                                                            
148. Juan Williams, Marshall’s Law, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 1990), 
http://www.thurgoodmarshall.com/speeches/tmlaw_article.htm. 
149. Justice Marshall was born in 1908. Biography of Associate Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1489&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Jan. 
23, 2014). 
150. Id. 
151. Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 1, at 96–98. 
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Democrat) observes that a Republican (or Democratic) President is in office 
and an election is nearing.152 We could then rerun the simulations. 
We have no strong intuitions about whether liberal or conservative 
Justices strategically retire at a higher rate. Part of the problem is that there 
is no good method for identifying retirements driven by strategic 
considerations, as opposed to retirements driven by other considerations.153 
Did Justice Stevens retire strategically so that President Obama could 
appoint his successor? He was over ninety years of age when he chose to 
retire. Did Justice O’Connor retire strategically so that President Bush could 
appoint her replacement? She denies that she did so.154 We could try 
modeling strategic retirements based on historical data, and designate 
certain historical retirements as strategic on a “we know it when we see it” 
basis, but for now we feel uncomfortable making such a designation.155 
Hence, we take no position on whether there is any difference between the 
parties. 
The retirement decision model could also be modified to account for 
other variables, such as the sex of the Justice or other observable 
characteristics. 
CONCLUSION 
Presidents must weigh, balance, and trade off between many criteria 
when picking a nominee to the Supreme Court. Age and ideology are only 
two of the important criteria. However, because Supreme Court Justices 
serve for life, age at appointment is extremely important; younger 
appointees can be expected to serve more years on the Court and hence 
influence the ideological tenor of its opinions for a longer period of time. 
Because there is some evidence that Republicans appoint younger Justices 
                                                                                                                            
152. This is consistent with Bailey and Yoon’s approach. See Bailey & Yoon, supra note 
121, at 295–96. 
153. Or even deaths. Consider Justice Rehnquist’s death while on the Court. Charles Lane, 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist Dies, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/03/AR2005090301911.html. 
154. Cf. William Branigin et al., Supreme Court Justice O’Connor Resigns, WASH. POST 
(July 1, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/07/01/AR2005070100653.html (citing O’Connor’s need to spend time 
with her husband as her reason for retirement).  
155. If we were to do such a thing, we might maintain that, at least recently, Justices 
appointed by Republican Presidents would be far more likely to retire strategically than would 
Democratic President appointees, regardless of ideology. We would count Justices Souter, 
O’Connor, and probably Stevens, as strategic. The two most obvious candidates at present are 
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, but neither has made any move to date to retire. 
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than Democrats, we simulated the effect of a systematic difference in age of 
appointments on the ideological position of the median Justice. We found 
three things. First, and least surprising, if Republicans and Democrats 
behave in this fashion for an extended period of time, the Court will become 
more conservative. The simulated results clearly showed a conservative 
drift, and we believe, although are not certain, that the results are 
significant. Second, and mildly surprising, the Senate confirmation process 
can greatly reduce the intensity of this effect. Third, and completely 
unnoted before this article, the widely-touted proposal to limit Supreme 
Court Justices to a single eighteen-year term will almost completely 
eliminate the effect of the differential in age, and move the Court back to 
the center of the ideological spectrum. 
